CVE-2024-26752
l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data
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l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data l2tp_ip6_sendmsg needs to avoid accounting for the transport header twice when splicing more data into an already partially-occupied skbuff. To manage this, we check whether the skbuff contains data using skb_queue_empty when deciding how much data to append using ip6_append_data. However, the code which performed the calculation was incorrect: ulen = len + skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue) ? transhdrlen : 0; ...due to C operator precedence, this ends up setting ulen to transhdrlen for messages with a non-zero length, which results in corrupted packets on the wire. Add parentheses to correct the calculation in line with the original intent.
Reserved 2024-02-19 | Published 2024-04-03 | Updated 2024-12-19 | Assigner Linuxgit.kernel.org/...c/4c3ce64bc9d36ca9164dd6c77ff144c121011aae
git.kernel.org/...c/c1d3a84a67db910ce28a871273c992c3d7f9efb5
git.kernel.org/...c/dcb4d14268595065c85dc5528056713928e17243
git.kernel.org/...c/0da15a70395182ee8cb75716baf00dddc0bea38d
git.kernel.org/...c/13cd1daeea848614e585b2c6ecc11ca9c8ab2500
git.kernel.org/...c/804bd8650a3a2bf3432375f8c97d5049d845ce56
git.kernel.org/...c/83340c66b498e49353530e41542500fc8a4782d6
git.kernel.org/...c/359e54a93ab43d32ee1bff3c2f9f10cb9f6b6e79
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