Description
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.
Problem types
CWE-321 Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Product status
Any version before all known versions prior to 2025-10-23
Credits
Joseph Tartaro of IOActive
Enrique Nissim of IOActive
Ethan Shackelford of IOActive
References
www.ioactive.com/...5/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf
www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/
www.wired.com/...-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/
www.vulncheck.com/...aster-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain
