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Please see our statement on Data Privacy.
OpenBao exists to provide a software solution to manage, store, and distribute sensitive data including secrets, certificates, and keys. In versions 2.3.1 and below, some OpenBao deployments intentionally limit privileged API operators from executing system code or making network connections. However, these operators can bypass both restrictions through the audit subsystem by manipulating log prefixes. This allows unauthorized code execution and network access that violates the intended security model. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.2. To workaround, users can block access to sys/audit/* endpoints using explicit deny policies, but root operators cannot be restricted this way.
Reserved 2025-08-04 | Published 2025-08-09 | Updated 2025-08-09 | Assigner GitHub_MCWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
github.com/...penbao/security/advisories/GHSA-xp75-r577-cvhp
github.com/openbao/openbao/pull/1634
discuss.hashicorp.com/...e-code-on-the-underlying-host/76033
github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.3.2
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