Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT. A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region. KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40) The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets. This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size. Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit. Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.
Product status
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (git) before 8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (git) before 906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (git) before ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (git) before 5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3
6.12.83 (semver)
6.18.24 (semver)
6.19.14 (semver)
7.0.1 (semver)
References
git.kernel.org/...c/8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384
git.kernel.org/...c/906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4
git.kernel.org/...c/ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b
git.kernel.org/...c/5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3