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Description

A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.

PUBLISHED Reserved 2026-04-02 | Published 2026-04-22 | Updated 2026-04-22 | Assigner canonical




MEDIUM: 5.3CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Problem types

CWE-367: Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

Product status

Default status
affected

Credits

Zellic finder

References

github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10328 exploit

github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10328 issue-tracking

cve.org (CVE-2026-35345)

nvd.nist.gov (CVE-2026-35345)

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