Description
n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.
Problem types
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Product status
References
github.com/...8n-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-4ggg-h7ph-26qr
github.com/...ommit/d9d847f230923d96e0857ccecf3a4dedcc9b0096
github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/releases/tag/v2.47.4