Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.
Problem types
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-913: Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
Product status
References
github.com/...isonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw