Description
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability
Date added 2026-05-27 | Due date 2026-06-10
Known Ransomware Campaign(s)
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
Problem types
CWE-506: Embedded Malicious Code
Product status
1.166.15
1.161.12
0.0.7
1.161.12
1.154.15
1.169.8
1.166.19
1.166.18
1.167.71
1.166.54
0.0.50
1.166.58
1.166.49
1.169.8
1.166.19
1.167.9
1.166.48
1.167.41
1.168.6
1.161.14
1.166.56
1.169.8
1.166.19
1.166.18
1.167.68
1.166.53
1.166.57
1.168.8
1.161.12
1.169.26
1.167.36
1.166.47
1.166.41
1.166.15
1.161.13
1.169.8
1.166.19
1.166.18
1.167.64
1.166.49
1.166.53
1.166.15
References
www.cisa.gov/...erabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-45321
github.com/...router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx
github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383
tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
www.stepsecurity.io/...y-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem