Description
mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.
Problem types
CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
Product status
References
github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq