Home

Description

The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.

PUBLISHED Reserved 2026-04-08 | Published 2026-05-22 | Updated 2026-05-27 | Assigner Docker




HIGH: 8.8CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

HIGH: 8.2CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Problem types

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Product status

Default status
unaffected

4.56.0 (semver) before 4.71.0
affected

Credits

David Rochester (@davidrxchester) finder

Nicholas Gould (@gouldnicholas) finder

References

docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/ release-notes

cve.org (CVE-2026-5843)

nvd.nist.gov (CVE-2026-5843)

Download JSON