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Description

The LabOne Q serialization framework uses a class-loading mechanism (import_cls) to dynamically import and instantiate Python classes during deserialization. Prior to the fix, this mechanism accepted arbitrary fully-qualified class names from the serialized data without any validation of the target class or restriction on which modules could be imported. An attacker can craft a serialized experiment file that causes the deserialization engine to import and instantiate arbitrary Python classes with attacker-controlled constructor arguments, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the Python process. Exploitation requires the victim to load a malicious file using LabOne Q's deserialization functions, for example a compromised experiment file shared for collaboration or support purposes.

PUBLISHED Reserved 2026-05-01 | Published 2026-05-01 | Updated 2026-05-01 | Assigner NCSC.ch




HIGH: 7.8CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

HIGH: 8.4CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Problem types

CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Product status

Default status
unaffected

2.41.0 (python) before 26.1.2
affected

26.4.0b1 (python)
affected

References

www.zhinst.com/support/security/2026/zi-sa-2026-002/ (ZI-SA-2026-002) vendor-advisory

cve.org (CVE-2026-7584)

nvd.nist.gov (CVE-2026-7584)

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